The relation of heterodox economics towards the mainstream of economics has recently been subject to debate (Colander et al. 2008 , Colander 2006 , King 2006. Closely related there has been a discussion on the appropriate strategy for PKE (Fontana and Gerrad 2006). This paper contributes to these debates. The dialectics between academic hegemony and economic (and social) stability have been strangely overlooked. In times of crisis the dominant economic paradigm often becomes vulnerable. This opens possibilities for deviants. Unfortunately, as the world goes trough financial turmoil Post Keynesians have been unable to get out of their niche: much of present debates focuses on core areas (monetary macroeconomics, mediumterm growth theory) while it remains silent on important real world phenomena such as ICT, globalisation, precarisation, or climate change. As a way forward for PKE we suggest: (1) 
Introduction
Post Keynesian Economics (PKE) is at a cross road. While Post Keynesians ( This paper the internal and external challenges that PKE (Post Keynesian Economics) confronts. We argue that communication with the mainstream is not a feasible strategy as the mainstream is unlikely to listen to Post Keynesian arguments and try to formultat a strategy for PKE to move forward by taking into account a triple set of conditions: (1) changes in the economy or as we will call it changes in the regime of accumulation, (2) developments within the mainstream and (3) debates within and achievements and shortcomings of PKE. Rather than focusing on its relation to the mainstream PKs should develop their analysis further. In doing so, PKs have to address weaknesses in their approach and should seek cooperation with other heterodox approaches in developing politically relevant problem-oriented alternatives to mainstream analyses.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 opens with a brief overview of important social and economic changes in the post-Fordist mode of development. We identify a neoliberal area and a area of enlightened neoliberalism. Section 3 discusses the development of the mainstream during this time. Section 4 turns to the development of Post Keynesian economics (PKE) and aims to identify achievements and weaknesses. Section 5 outlines a possible strategy for the future development of PKE. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Changes in the accumulation regime: from Fordism to neoliberalism and enlightened neoliberalism
As there are interdependencies between the political economic development and the fate of economic theories we start with a brief overview over the most significant economic developments of the Post-war period. The 1950s to the mid 1970s of the last century marked what has been called 'golden age' of capitalism or Fordism.
1 Based on a class compromise (or truce) between labor and capital, it was characterized by high growth and an active state.
The international financial system was dominated by the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Most states where characterised by an expanding public sector that procured the basic infrastructure of the economy and governments (in most developed countries) were committed to expansionary interventions in case of recessions. The welfare state emerged in many countries and provided a social safety net. This stable international and domestic background brought an unprecedented economic boom. Cooperative industrial relations played an important role. Employment was high and labour movements where strong.
The period of rapid growth came to an end in the mid 1970s. The prolonged period of full employment put the working class in a powerful position and led to a systematic upwardpressure on wages. Industrial conflict soared. In combination with increased international competition this led to what later came to be called 'profit squeeze' (Glyn et al 1990) .
Productivity growth slowed in part because of a slowdown in capital investment. The economic slowdown was further aggravated by the general hike in commodity prices and the oil price shocks. This external inflationary pressure triggered a wage-price spiral.
Simultaneously the Bretton Woods system broke down under the pressure of persistent payment imbalances. This led to a stagflationary period and unemployment rates soared (by the times' standards) which was widely conceived as a crisis of the contemporary Keynesian policy framework. Political economists (Smithin 1996 , Glyn 2006 Third, domestic and international financial markets were gradually deregulated and liberalized. The belief in free markets led to a large-scale promotion of the ideas of free trade and international capital mobility. This led to fundamental changes in the financial landscape.
At the domestic level the change in the financial framework gave rise to a rapid pace of financial innovation, eventually increasing the scope for speculation. At the international level the liberalization of capital flows was the precondition of the international mobility of capital.
Both developments strengthened the influence of the financial sector. Financial ratios such as stock market capitalization, derivatives turnover or cross-border lending soared (Glyn 2006, p.51) . Real interest rates rose well above the growth rates of real GDP. Overall the income shares of financial capital increased substantially (Duménil and Lévy 2001, Power et al 2003) .
Moreover, the influence of financial investors on non-financial business has increased substantially under the so called shareholder value revolution (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000) . The structure of the economy by now can increasingly be characterised as financialisation; a structure of accumulation dominated by the financial sector (Stockhammer 2008b The neoliberal regime with deregulated finance has led to lingering social tension due to increasing social polarization and to a succession of financial crises. As the world goes trough financial turmoil even the enlightened version of neoliberalism is under pressure and increasingly questioned (Stiglitz 2008) even by former proponents (Wolf 2008) . This in all likelihood will have some feedback on the dominant academic theories. To what extent this will benefit PKE is open. We do not intend to imply that the present crisis (or any of the ones that will certainly follow in deregulated financial regime) will bring about a (Post) Keynesian renaissance, but it will raise profound questions for the mainstream and thus create opportunities of heterodox economists.
The mainstream: plus ca change … -
It has never been straightforward to define the mainstream. In order for the mainstream to be convincing it has to be broad enough to allow for debates. It cannot be completely homogenous but has to allow for conflicting views. Rather than identifying the mainstream with a particular theory, we define it as a common ground for debate (that excludes some arguments or theories). Why then is it meaningful to talk of a mainstream? In our view the crucial feature of the mainstream is that it appears to be free of ideology, that it does not constitute a particular school of thought but rather Economics.
Rather than giving a clear-cut definition, let us circumscribe the mainstream institutionally with respect to three dimensions: (1) what is published in the leading journals (2) Neoclassical-Keynesian Synthesis had four important features. First, there was an uneasy split -one is tempted to say schizophrenia -between microeconomics and macroeconomics. While microeconomics was the world of rational behaviour, utility functions, of optimizing behaviour and of clearing markets (short, based on first principles), macroeconomics for large parts was pragmatic aimed at 'realism' often taking social groups (rather than individuals) as starting point. Behavioral functions were intended to be realistic (plausible in an inductive sense) and non-clearing markets (in particular labour markets) were taken for granted. To be sure, there was no lack of tension between microeconomics and macroeconomics, which in turn fuelled research. A second feature is closely related to this schizophrenia: a sharp distinction between the short run and the long run (in particular in macroeconomics). This allowed leading economists (such as Samuelson or Solow) to be Keynesian (in the short run)
as well as neoclassical (in the long run). Thirdly, in economic policy the mainstream was post-liberal (the term embedded liberalism has been coined for the postwar system): important parts of the economy were heavily shaped by state intervention, in particular the welfare state cushioned the market mechanism and financial markets were strongly regulated.
Countercyclical policy was part of the policy agenda.
In the course of the 1970s and 80s substantial changes occurred in all three fields: policy, macro and micro. The shift in economic policy has already been discussed in the section 2.
The break in macroeconomics was a conspicuous one. By the standards of the profession, one is tempted to say that there was an outright war, which ended with a redefinition of how macroeconomics had to be done -there had to be microfoundations. The neoclassical attack took several forms (a rediscovery of Hayek, Monetarism, New Classical Economics, Real
Business Cycle theory) and succeeded in establishing that in macroeconomics behavioural functions had to be derived from 'first principles', i.e. behavioural functions had to be derived from individual optimizing behaviour. This revolution was not without contradictions and the different waves interpreted the first principles differently: Friedman was accused of lacking microfoundations, New Classicals insisted on instantaneous market clearing and were happy to employ representative agents, Hayek abhorred both and so forth. But this contradiction must not conceal how effective their overhaul of macroeconomics has been.
Eventually there was a reformulation of The break in microeconomics was more of a shift than a break. Maybe it should be characterized as the establishment of niches rather than a shift. At the same time that New Classicals were resurrecting neoclassical macroeconomics it became increasingly acceptable to transcend the neoclassical research program in microeconomics itself. Colander et al. (2004) define the neoclassical research program as the holy trinity of rationality, greed and equilibrium. Each of these has been questioned. Chronologically the order probably should be reversed: First, a powerful literature emerged demonstrating that under asymmetric information (and rational behaviour) markets will typically not clear (Akerlof 2006 , Stiglitz 1987 ). The implications of this approach are profound theoretically but ambiguous practically.
Unlike the transaction costs of New Keynesian macro, information asymmetries do not disappear in the long run. Competitive equilibrium will not be pareto efficient and the First Welfare Theorem does not hold (Stiglitz 1994 Micro, indeed, has become a much more diverse field. Arguments can be made now, that only two decades ago would have been frowned upon and dismissed as irrelevant or, worse, sociological. However, Colander et al's claim that "holy trinity of rationality, greed, and equilibrium is in the process of being replaced with a new orthodoxy, which can be described as an approach based on a holy trinity of purposeful behaviour, enlightened self-interest, and sustainability" (Colander et al 2004, VIII) seems far fetched. 8 While there may be a "process" there certainly is no "new orthodoxy" yet (as Colander et al acknowledge).
Institutionally, however, the mainstream has become more rather than less exclusive. The high degree of formalization of economics is probably the one of the most important barriers for heterodox economists (Lawson 2006) . But many of the heterodox papers are formal. A frequent experience of heterodox economists that their papers are rejected by mainstream 6 Basically no central bank is using a RBC model of the economy. It this sense they are all New Keynesians now. However in the form of DGSE models the RBC models sneak in again in policy making. 7 Overviews include Gintis 2000 and Fehr and Fischbacher 2002. journals without even being sent out to referees. The establishment of journal ratings and their use in tenure and hiring decisions is stifling innovation (Frey 2003) and has made it a lot harder for heterodox economists to get their work recognized. And there is a complex intermingling of politics and exclusionary mainstream: There are some theorems that are considered deep truths-such as that free trade is a good thing, 9 that minimum wages are bad for employment -that can only be questioned at the cost of potential loss of reputation despite the fact that there is a substantial literature questioning the theorems.
10
Economic policy is not only influenced by economic theories, but also by political interests.
One should thus not be surprised if economic policy at times conflicts with ideology.
Nonetheless one can discern some pattern. In the 1980s neoliberals were ruling the show.
Since the mid 1990s one does notice some less dogmatic position in the international organizations and the USA (but less so in Europe). Most stark is the double standard about the trust in financial liberalization. While deregulation and liberalization and an anti-inflationary response in case of financial crisis were forcefully preached to (and at times forced up by the IMF) the developing world, the policy reaction to the financial crises in the USA seemed to be little affected by trust in the self-healing abilities of the market system that neoliberalism had been preaching for decades. Whether this feeds back into theorizing remains to be seen. In Keynes' theory of effective demand into a theory of the long run. This led a focus on theories of growth and distribution (Kaldor 1956 , Robinson 1956 ) that was supplemented by monetary and financial aspects by an American line of economists (Weintraub 1959 , Minsky 1957 ).
These economists were deviants in a theoretical sense but as the capital controversies show they were still taken seriously by the mainstream (Samuelson and Levhari 1966 , Solow 1975 , Harcourt 1969 ).
The issues of distribution and growth -particularly in the form of Kaleckian modelsremained prominent in the Post Keynesian discussion ever since. The foundation of these models is a class-based analysis of the growth process. They usually entail capacity underutilization and mark-up pricing (Dutt 1987) . The modern appearance of these models usually has an exogenously determined profit margin (via a mark-up pricing) which implies exogenously determined real wages. Further these models commonly exhibit the paradox of thrift and the paradox of cost. The paradox of thrift results out of the assumption that capitalists save more than workers. Since the economy grows until investment equilibrates savings a(n exogenous) redistribution of income towards workers increases growth. Via accelerated growth thus a reduction in the aggregate propensity to save leads to an increase in aggregate savings. The paradox of costs on the other hand refers to the fact that an increase in costs (i.e. wages) leads to an increase in economic activity and thus to an increase in profit. In extended versions different accumulation regimes are possible (Blecker 1989, Marglin and Badhuri 1990) ; that is the growth of the economy might be profit-led or wage-led. The
Kaleckian model further is the basis of the rich PK analysis of inflation. In this literature inflation is regarded as a cost-push phenomenon or a result of an unresolved distributional conflict (Hein and Stockhammer 2007) .
The specific Post Keynesian focus on monetary issues on the other hand was in part a reaction to the rise of monetarism. Long before it was (implicitly) acknowledged by the mainstream Post Keynesians insisted on the endogenous nature of the money supply (Kaldor 1982) . This insight led to a focus on the functioning of the banking sector which in the late 1980s triggered a massive debate about the particular shape of the money supply function. The Post Keynesian views on endogenous money largely fell into two camps. The horizontalist analysis started with the observation that loans create deposits which at the time was an exact inversion of standard wisdom. Since thus, the banking sector was not constrained quantitatively they concluded that the money supply is solely determined by the creditworthy demand for credit; that is the money supply is demand-determined (Moore 1989).
Structuralists on the other hand maintained that the asset and liability management of banks matters. From this point of view the money supply is in principle endogenous to the banking system. However, the larger the sum of outstanding credit becomes the more difficulties arise for banks to maintain the reserve requirements and the higher the average risk of credits becomes. Consequently, there exists some systematic relationship between the amount of outstanding credit and the interest rate (Pollin 1991 , Palley 1996 . 11 This discussion yielded a deep understanding of the functioning of the banking industry. Despite the fact that it is still ongoing there seems to be some convergence of the respective positions (Fontana 2004).
Based on this broad theoretical background Post Keynesian authors recently started to develop a well-grounded critique of the NCM (Arestis and Sawyer 2004 ). An obvious critique originating out of the Post Keynesians understanding of banking is the lack of an analysis of the banking sector. There is some progress compared to earlier neoclassical models in that the money supply is endogenous to the model but it is simply determined as a residual without considering the role of the banking sector. This is particularly surprising given the fact that NCM implicates a massive focus on monetary policy by its insistence on inflation targeting. Financial instability still appears as an anomaly in the standard Post Keynesian macromodels. propose the same kind of pre-Keynesian macroeconomic policies. Post Keynesians lack an explanation of the stronghold that orthodox economics has on the profession and on the state. Kalecki (1943) had highlighted the political contradiction of full employment policies, but this issue has not been addressed systematically by Post Keynesians. There is no systematic analysis of the motives and impact of political interest groups.
5) Finally, PKE seems to offer little to evaluate such developments as precarisation or flexicurity from a social perspective. PKE has little to say on issues by which important groups of modern societies are concerned.
To be sure we believe that PKE (as heterodox approach in general) are a better starting point for analysis than orthodox approaches. However, orthodox approaches are not the relevant benchmark. The key question is whether PKE is useful in understanding economic and social changes in modern capitalism and provides policy strategies. To do soPKE will need to tackle some blind spots its analysis. This is aggravated by the fact that Post Keynesian (Heterodox) authors are often discriminated by the mainstream which in most economics departments enjoys a power position (Dequech 2007-8) .
How to move on
On the other hand Lawson (2006) has argued that methodology is the unifying thread for heterodox economists. This view implies that heterodox economists by definition cannot enter a discussion with the mainstream as they speak a different language -they analyse the economy as an open system rather than as a closed system. More specifically Lavoie (2006) points out that there are similarities between various heterodox positions on crucial issues like rationality and an organicistic approach to society.
Our contribution to this debate is not a novel position on whether it is desirable to enter a dialogue with the mainstream or not. (It would be. 14 ) Rather our point is that the issue of entering into a dialogue is a secondary one for the future of PKE. Whether PKs put more effort into entering a dialogue with the mainstream will make little difference, simply because there is little indication that the core of the mainstream is interested in this dialogue. In fact it typically does not even recognize the existence of the PKE (or most other heterodox streams).
In contemplating strategies for the future, we argue that the focus on the relation to the mainstream is misplaced. Rather PKE should look at the real world (to identify pressing problems), look at themselves (to identify holes and contradictions in their analysis) and at other heterodox streams (to find specific areas of complementarities). In other words we recommend that PKE (1) try to be relevant (for economic policy issues), (2) try to build institutional links with other heterodox positions to defend non-mainstream spaces and (3) to develop PKE further to address black spots. For this PKs will need to cooperate with other heterodox positions and with innovative fringes of the mainstream. We shall now elaborate on each of these points.
Our first assertion is the most basic one: be politically relevant. 15 It is hard to overstate the importance of this. In particular it is crucial to develop analysis for new social and economic problems. This is crucial to attract new students as well as the attention of media and the economic policy institutions.
While we have little hope of displacing mainstream in the short run, we doubt that this hegemony will go unchallenged in the future. But change is unlikely to come from within the profession. Rather, mainstream economics is digging in its heels and fortifying the exclusion of heterodox positions by means of journal ratings etc. Innovative microeconomics is unlikely to change that. Economics will be changed by forces from the outside. It's the economy rather than economics that will call for change. The finance-dominated accumulation regime is prone to crises due to unregulated financial markets while the neoliberal mode of regulation is effectively excluding large segments of the population as reflected in a polarization of income distribution, the emergence of the working poor and the precarization of substantial segments of the labor market.
This does not mean that a systemic crisis or a revolutionary upheaval is around the corner. But it does mean that orthodox economics and the neoliberal mode of development will loose legitimacy. As already apparent in the handling of the present financial crisis, neoliberal principles are pragmatically jettisoned to save financial institutions. Thus, why should we not also ignore them in order to help the unemployed? Or in American English: Why help Wall St but not Main St.? Different fields of economics will be differently affected by such debates, but macroeconomics will certainly be at the centre of many debates. This will be an opportunity for PKE to proof its usefulness. But it also poses challenges for PKE. PKs have neglected developing the theory of financial crises. Moreover, the present crisis will not be a re-run of the 1930s. Governments as well as New Keynesian economists are much more pragmatic than their counterparts 80 years ago. At the same time the social movements pressing for change are much more heterogeneous as are the social tensions out of which they have grown. Nor is there a strong political movement (as the socialist movement of the 1920s) pushing for fundamental societal change. In other words, it is not clear to what extent PKE will be able to benefit from the repercussions that the present financial crisis will have on economics. Developing an analysis (and policy suggestions) for present problems will force Post Keynesians not develop further their theory of financial crisis but also to address issues that they have had little to say about as of yet: globalization, the working poor, atypical employment relations.
While the medium run may offer more room for debates, in the present and the near future, the situation of PK has accurately been described as that of an embattled minority ( PKs should thus seek to cooperate institutionally with other heterodox approaches and nonorthodox streams in the fight for a pluralistic economics. PKs alone simply don't have the critical mass to press for more inclusive journal ratings and evaluation mechanisms. For that large associations are needed as lobbying institutions and the formation of a heterodox camp may offer a chance for this (EAEPE, AHE).
In terms of research agenda PK have a lot of homework to do. As elaborated in section 3, PKE has in several important aspects kept too closely to its original research program and shows crucial gaps in its analysis. PKE, in other words, has to become more Post and less Keynesian. Changes in actual structures and dynamics as well as developments in mainstream economics as well as in other heterodox approach have made many of these gaps apparent.
Some examples will illustrate our case. First, consider the role of institutions. While it may not be very surprising that institutionalists have more to say about institutions in general than PK, it certainly is ironic that mainstream economics now often makes a much more elaborated empirical attempt to include the effects of institutions on economic growth than PKE despite the fact that PK have long argued (certainly much longer than mainstream growth theory) that institutions matter for growth.
Second, there is a broad range of recent social and economic phenomena that PKs have had little to say about: ICT, globalization, precarisation, environmental destruction. Many of these changes are either "too supply-side" or "too micro" for PKs. While some of these issues may seem remote from PK theory, others are close to home, but have been ignored. For example, there is next to no discussion of environmental degredation in PK growth theory.
Third, PKE has also failed to elaborate a theory of the state and the social groups (social classes?) that influences government behaviour. Essentially PKE has no answer to the question, why pre-Keynesian economic policies persist. In Keynes' times it was easy to argue, that they didn't know better. Neoliberalism, however, seems to have been a deliberate decision not to use Keynesian policies. Enlightened neoliberalism uses government policies selectively and in a class-biased way.
In all these areas there should be obvious potential gains from cooperation between PKs and other heterodox positions. Institutional and evolutionary economics have elaborate theories of institutions, Ecological Economists have done a lot to highlight the detrimental effects of growth, Marxists have developed rich theories of class and the state. We are not advocating a grand heterodox synthesis, but problem-specific heterodox synthesis approaches. 16 Take realworld problems and analyse them by making use of different heterodox approaches. PKE is plainly not sufficient to do justice to many of today's social and economic problem.
6.Conclusion
The discussion on the future of PKE has focused on PKE's relation to the mainstream. This is an important issues and the debate has served to highlight the rich and contradictory While the dialogue with the mainstream is desirable, the key questions for PKs lie somewhere else. First, PKE has to be relevant in explaining real-world problems. The neoliberal mode of development delivers enough of them as the present financial crisis demonstrates. This may come with its own dilemmas, e.g. academic credibility vs. political applicability, but it will raise more interesting question than trying to reformulate PK models such that there are easy to understand for mainstream economists (if they care to listen). Second, institutionally, PK should strengthen their ties with other heterodox economists to defend space for pluralism in the profession. Thirdly, PKE should fill its gaps in its theory. Many of the present day social and economic problems are not sufficiently addressed in PK analysis. Doing so will take PKs beyond PKE, they should do so by cooperating with other heterodox streams.
